### IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF SELECTED TEXAS OFFENSES: A QUICK REFERENCE CHART By Jodi Goodwin and Thomas Esparza, Jr. Immigration Specialists

TERMAG	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ACCRAMATED	<u> </u>	DOMESTIC VIOL	ALTERNATE
TEXAS OFFENSE	ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE	AGGRAVATED FELONY (AF)	CRIME INVOLVE MORAL TURPI- TUDE (CIMT)	DOMESTIC VIOL., CHILD ABUSE, FRAUD FIREARMS, ETC	ALTERNATE PLEAS AND PRACTICE TIPS
Murder § 19.02  First or Second Degree Felony	1) Intentionally, knowingly 2) Causes individual death 3) Intends to cause serious bodily injury & commits act clearly dangerous to life 4) Commits felony (except manslaughter) and in course of commits act clearly dangerous to life	Yes, per INA 101(a)(43)(A), 8 USC 101(a)(43)(A)	Murder is a CIMT		Plead to \$19.05 if possible. But, a willful omission or neglect to perform duty resulting in death may be murder.
Manslaug hter § 19.04 Second Degree Felony	1) Recklessly 2) Causes individual's death  A person is reckless when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur. (TX Penal Code Ann §6.03(c))  Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867(BIA1994)	No. Not 101(a)(43)(F) crime of violence –as defined by 18 USC 16 as no substantial risk force would be used (16(b)). <u>U.S. v.Vargas -Duran</u> , 319 F.3d 194 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003); <u>U.S. v. Calderon-Pena</u> , 2004 WL 1888407 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir.).	Probably. Presence or absence of a corrupt mind or evil intent is not controlling; criminally reckless acts are sufficient. Matter of Medina, 15 I&N Dec. 611, 614 (BIA1976)		
Criminally Negligent Homicide § 19.05 State Jail Felony	1) Causes individual's death 2) By criminal negligence. Criminally neg. homicide requires defendant should have been aware of risk but failed to perceive it. Avila v. State 954 S.W.2d 830. (App.8 Dist. 1997)	No. Not murder, COV - force not element of the crime, and no substantial risk that force could be used.(US v. Dominguez-Ochoa, 386 F.3d 639 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004))	No 'evil intent', so it is arguably not a CIMT. Although criminally reckless behavior may constitute CIMT, criminally negligent behavior generally does not.		Crim.neg. hom. committed by omission, Dowdenv.State, 758 S.W.2d 264 (Cr.App.1988) Safety Note: obtain sentence of less than lyr.
Unlawful Restraint, § 20.02 Class A Misdemea nor	1) Intentionally, Knowingly 2) Restrains (Restricts a person's movement w/o consent)	No. Not a COV b/c force is not a necessary element of the offense (18 USC § 16(a))	Statute on its face does not require that turpitudinous conduct occur, so not likely CIMT. Also, although it requires knowledge, it does not require exposing another to serious bodily injury, which has been held to be CIMT.	No. Not a crime of violence, and therefore not a crime of DV	Unlaw restraint alternate plea if noncitizen faces kidnap charges
Unlawful Restraint, §20.02(c)( 1) State Jail Felony	20.02(a) elements and 3) Person restrained was less than 17yrs old	No. Likely not an agfel; COV analysis under 18 USC § 16(b) would not change b/c of age of restrained person	May be CIMT if the court finds that restraining an individual under 17 is turpitudinous	Not a crime of violence, and therefore not a crime of DV	Unlaw. restraint  – alternate plea if noncitizen faces kidnap charges <u>Safety Note</u> : obtain sentence of less thanlyr.
Unlawful Restraint,	20.02(a) elements and 4) Recklessly exposes victim	No. Not a COV, as no	Probably CIMT because of the reckless	Maybe Aggravating	Divis. statute – clarify record is

e	Prepared for the City of Aust				da
§ 20.02(c)(2	to substantial risk of serious	element or risk of force;	exposure to another to a substantial risk of	factors also increase the	devoid of force
20.02(c)(2	bodily injury or,	categorical analysis.	substantial risk of serious bodily injury.	likelihood of	to avoid any argument that
)	5) Knows that the victim is	(See <u>Chapa-Garza</u> ,	serious bodily injury.		
7F1 ' 1	on-duty public servant, or	Vargas-Duran, Calderon-		being labeled a	substantial risk
Third	6) While in custody restrains	Pena.)		crime of DV	of seriousbodily
Degree	another individual				injury in sec. #4
Felony					requires force.
					See <u>U.S. v.</u>
					<u>Taylor</u> , 495
					U.S. 575
					(1990).
Kidnappin	1) Intentionally or knowingly	Maybe.	Generally held to be	See crime of	Keep factors
g, §20.03	2) Abducts (restrain with	If charged under sec.	CIMTBut see	violence analysis	unspecified on
	intent to prevent liberation	2(b) (using or	Hamdam v. INS, 98	in agfel column	record if facing
Third	by:	threatening deadly force)	F.3d 183 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir.		an aggravated
Degree	a) secreting or holding, OR	it is a COV (16(a)). May	1996). <u>Hamdan</u> held		kidnap charge.
Felony	b) using or threatening to use	not be a COV under	that a LA conviction for		Divis. statute:
	deadly force);	16(b) given the various	simple kidnapping was		could support
	a person	ways one can kidnap.	not a CIMT. However,		argument that it
	P		the TX statute is not as		is not a COV
			broad.		under 16(a) or
			oroud.		(b). See <u>US v.</u>
					Taylor.
Indecency	1) Child younger than 17	Yes, per INA 101	CIMT because		Safety Note:
with a	2) Engages in sexual conduct,	(a)(43)(A) (F), 8 USC	improper sexual		obtain sentence
Child, §	3) With the intent to arouse	1101(a)(43) (A), (F)	conduct with minors is		of less than 1 yr.
21.11	or gratify	Indecent exposure	considered to be against		for crime of
21.11	a) Exposes anus, any part of	sufficient. Actual,	the accepted morals of		violence.
Casand an		_			violence.
Second or Third	genitals, or b) causes child to expose	physical contact not	society and inherently		But note that
		necessary. The act is	turpitudinous.		
Degree	anus or any part of genitals	'abusive' due to psych.			obtaining less
Felony		harm irre- spective of			than a 1 yr
		physical injury. <u>U.S. v.</u>			sentence does
		Zava -la-Sustaita, 214 F.			not affect agfel
		3d 601,605 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir			for sexual abuse
		2000). Indecency w/			of minor.
		sexual conduct entails a			
		subst. risk that physical			
		force may be used vs. the			
		victim, <u>U.S v.Velaz</u>			
		quez-Overa,100F3d 418			
		(5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996). <u>U.S. v.</u>			
		Rivera Perez, 322 F3d			
		350 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003)			
Assault	1) Intentionally, knowingly,	NO. <u>US v. Villegas</u>	Not a CIMT as per	Maybe.	<u>Safety Note</u> :
(simple), §	or recklessly	<u>Hernandez</u> , 468 F.3d 874	Matter of Fualaau		obtain sentence
22.01	a) Causes bodily injury to	(5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007); <u>US v.</u>			of less than 1yr.
	another	Zuniga Soto, 527 F.3d	Where recklessness is		
Misdemea	2) Intentionally or knowingly	1110 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008) Use	an element of the		The Fifth
nor	a) Threatens another with	of force is not an	statute, a crime of		circuits'
	imminent bodily injury; or	element of assault under	assault, can be, but is		decisions on
	3) intentionally or knowingly	22.01.	not per se, a crime		this statute have
	a) Causes physical contact		involving moral		gone both ways,
	with another when person		turpitude.		thus keeping the
	knows or should reasonably		Matter of Fualaau, 21		sentence to less
	believe that the other will		I&N Dec.475 (BIA		than a year
	regard the contact as		1996).		should be safe.
11	regard the contact as				
	offensive or provocative		However, willful		should be buile.

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			infliction of corporal injury on a family member has been held to constitute a CIMT.	
Sexual Assault, § 22.011 Second Degree Felony	Detailed elements	Is an aggfel as per INA § 101(a)(43)(A)	Forcible, non-consensual sexual physical contact is held to be CIMT.	Sexual assault of a minor is "sexual abuse of a minor." <u>US v.</u> <u>Izaguirre-Flores</u> , 405 F.3d 270 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005).
Aggravate d Assault, § 22.02 First or Second Degree Felony	Elements in 22.01 and 1) Causes serious bodily injury to another, or 2) Uses or exhibits deadly weapon during the commission of an assault	Is an aggfel as per INA 101(a)(43)(F). Meets def'n under 18 USC 16(b).	Most likely a CIMT under both the serious bodily injury element and deadly weapon element.	
Aggravate d Sexual Assault, § 22.021	Detailed elements	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)43)(A).	Again, forcible, non- consensual sexual physical contact is held to be CIMT. Also contains more aggravating factors which would also result in CIMT determination.	
Injury to a Child, Elderly Individual, or Disabled Individual, § 22.04	1) Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or 2) Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, 3) Causes to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual a) Serious bodily injury b) Serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury c) Or bodily injury	Maybe. Not an aggfel b/c not a crime of violence based on Gracia precedent dealing omissions, but see Perez Mun oz v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 357 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cr. 2007) (intentionally causing bodily injury to a child requires physical force and is a COV).  5 <sup>th</sup> Cir holds that b/c the injury to a child often stems from omission, rather than the intentional use of force, it is not a "crime of violence" under sentencing guidelines; a crime based on criminally negligent conduct is generally not considered a crime of violence under the USSG, U.S v. Gracia-Cantu 302 F.3d 308 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002)	Likely to be a CIMT because even though the injury may occur by omission, the omitted act may be deemed contrary to accepted social morals. However, criminally negligent injury may not constitute a CIMT under Matter of Sweester.	Will not be a crime of DV b/ not a crime of violence based on Gracia

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Abandoni	1) having custody, care, or	Is not an aggfel because	Abandonment has been		
ng or	control of a child younger	it is not a COV. Does	held a CIMT if requires		
Endangeri	than 15 years	not meet def'n of 16(a)	willfulness on the part		
ng a		or (b).	of the parent and the		
Child, §	2) intentionally abandons		destitution of the child.		
22.041	the child in any place under		Texas statue would		
	circumstances that expose the		likely constitute CIMT		
	child to an unreasonable risk		because of intentional		
	of harm. Or		mens rea and the		
			exposure of the child to		
	3) intentionally, knowingly,		an unreasonable risk of		
	recklessly, or with criminal		harm.		
	negligence, by act or		Endangering has been		
	omission, engages in conduct		held a CIMT even		
	that places a child younger		though it can be done		
	than 15 years in imminent		recklessly. Rodriguez		
	danger of death, bodily		Castro v. Gonzales, 427		
	injury, or physical or		F3d 316 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005);		
	mental impairment.		In Re Paulino-Ramirez		
	montai impuninent.		(unpublished BIA		
			decision).		
Terroristic	1) Threatens to commit any	Would be a crime of	Does not require evil	Note the	
Threat, §	offense involving violence to	violence, but would not	intent, or a corrupt state	definition in	
		be an aggfel, b/c the	of mind, so may	White is	
22.07(a)(1	any person or property with the intent to			different than the	
) or		maximum jail time for a	arguably not be a CIMT.	one used here.	
22.07(a)(2	2) Cause a reaction of any	Class B is 180 days, and a crime of violence has	CIMIT.	one used here.	
)	type to his threat by an				
CI D	official or volunteer agency	to have a sentence of a			
Class B	organized to deal with	year or more in order for			
Misdemea	emergencies OR	it to be an aggfel			
nor	3) Place any person in fear of	G			
	imminent serious bodily	Convictions under TX			
	injury	statutes proscribing			
		reckless conduct and			
		terroristic threats were			
		<b>not</b> convictions of a			
		"crime of domestic			
		violence," and thus could			
		not serve as predicate			
		convictions for the			
		charged offense			
		United States v. White			
		258 F.3d 374 (5th Cir.			
		2001)			
OFFENSE	ELEMENTS	AGG FEL	CIMT	COV, OTHER	ALT. PLEA
Terroristic	1) Threatens to commit any	Could possibly be an	Does not require evil	Likely to be a	Try to plea
Threat, §	offense involving violence to	aggfel if the sentence is a	intent, or a corrupt state	crime of violence	down to a Class
22.07(a)(3	any person or property	year or more; Most	of mind, so may	as per the crime	B or C
)	1) With intent to, prevent or	likely suffices the crime	arguably not be a	of DV definition	Misdemeanor if
'	interrupt	of violence definition as	CIMT.		possible. If you
Class A	2) The occupation or use of a	stated in 18 USC § 16(a)			must plea to a
Misdemea	building, room, place of	5ca iii 10 000 g 10(a)			Class A, try to
nor					get less than a
1101	accembly place to which the				ELL BAN HIAH A
	assembly, place to which the				
	public has access, place of				year jail time
	public has access, place of employment or occupation,				
	public has access, place of employment or occupation, aircraft, automobile, or other				
	public has access, place of employment or occupation,				

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Terroristic Threat, § 22.07(a)(4) Third Degree Felony	1) Threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property 2) With intent to 3) Cause impairment or interruption of public communications, public transportation, public water, gas or power supply or other public service	Will be an aggfel if sentenced to one year, because it satisfies the crime of violence definition in 18 USC § 16(b). Note that a deferred adjudication is not a sentence to a term of imprisonment, therefore a deferred for longer than a year would	Does not require evil intent, or a corrupt state of mind, so may arguably not be a CIMT.	Will likely be a Crime of DV b/c it is a crime of violence as per 8 USC §16(b)	Try to plead down to the lesser Class B and C misdemeanors
Criminal Nonsuppo rt, § 25.05	1)Intentionally and knowingly 2)Fail to provide child support for a child under 18 or otherwise under court order to support	not be an aggfel COV.  Not an aggfel.	Not a CIMT because statute does not require the child be in destitute circumstances, be in need of the support of the parent, have become or is likely to become a public charge, or that the health or the life of the child has been impaired.		
Violation of Protective Order or Magistrate 's Order, § 25.07	Detailed Elements	Offense not aggfel because does not meet def'n of 16(a) or (b).	Divisible statute: section describing family violence or threats to a protected individual would most likely constitute CIMT; section describing going to a particular place arguably not a CIMT because of lack of evil intent. However, intentional and knowing mens rea may defeat this argument.		
Arson, § 28.02	Detailed Elements	Because courts take a broad view of what "offense described in" means, arson may be an aggravated felony. See 18 U.S.C. 844 (f) and (i). Should argue that state offense is not "described in" 844, but there is a possibility that argument won't work.	Generally held to constitute CIMT because of evil intent.		
Criminal Mischief, § 28.03	1) Person w/o effective consent of the owner; 2) Intentionally or knowingly 3) Damages or destroys tangible property owner, or 4) Tampers w/ tangible property owner and causes pecuniary	Not an aggfel b/c not a crime of violence; not a violation of 18 U.S.C §16(a)  Defendant's conviction for violation of Texas	Not likely to be a CIMT, because the crime does not have an evil intent, nor does it demonstrate an action that is contrary to our social morals. Also,	Not likely to be Crime of DV, because not a crime of violence	

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	loss or substantial	"criminal mischief"	statute does not require		
	inconvenience to the owner or a	statute was not a	maliciousness, so it is		
	third person	"crime of violence" for	not inherently base and		
	5) Makes markings, including	the purposes of	vile.		
	inscriptions, slogans, drawings,	sentencing guidelines,			
	or paintings, on tangible	U.S v. Landeros-			
		Gonzales			
	property owner.				
		262 F.3d 424			
		(5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001)			
OFFENSE	ELEMENTS	AGG FEL	CIMT	COV, OTHER	ALT. PLEA
Reckless	1)without the effective consent	Not an aggfel.	Does not appear to be a		
Damage, §	of the owner,		CIMT because it lacks		
28.04	2)recklessly damages or		both an intentional		
	destroys property of the owner		harm element and any		
	3 1 1 3		harm to another person.		
Graffiti, §	Detailed Elements	Not an aggfel.	Does not appear to be a		
28.08	Betanea Brements	Tivot un aggion	CIMT.		
Robbery,	1)in the course of committing	Is an aggfel as per	CIMT: Matter of		
			Martin, 18 I&N Dec.		
§ 29.02	theft as defined in Chapter 31	101(a)(43)(F) and (G).			
	and	With both of these	226 (BIA 1982).		
	2)with intent to obtain or	sections, the sentence			
	maintain control of the	to a term of			
	property, he:	imprisonment has to			
	3) intentionally, knowingly, or	be at least one year to			
	recklessly causes bodily injury	be an agfel, so a			
	to another; or	deferred adjudication			
	4) intentionally or knowingly	for this offense would			
	threatens or places another in	NOT be and aggfel (or			
	fear of imminent bodily injury	any term of			
	or death.	imprisonment les than			
	or death.	one year).			
Aggravata	Detailed Elements	See analysis of	CIMT: Matter of		
Aggravate	Detailed Elements				
d		Robbery above.	Martin, 18 I&N Dec.		
Robbery,			226 (BIA 1982).		
§ 29.03					
Burglary,	1) Person without effective	Burglary is an aggfel	Burglary is a CIMT if		Note: try to
§ 30.02	consent of the owner	as long as a one year	committed with the		negotiate less
	2) Enters a habitation, or a	sentence is imposed.	intent to commit theft.		than a year
State Jail	building (or any portion of a		If committed with the		sentence
Felony;	building) not then open to the	Burglary of a building	intent to commit a		
First and	public	is not an crime of	felony, only a CIMT if		
Second	3) With intent to commit a	violence for sentence	underlying felony is a		
Degree	felony, theft or an assault, or;	enhancement	CIMT. If committed		
Felony	4) Remains concealed, with	purposes; Although	with intent to commit		
1 Clony		violent confrontations			
	intent to commit a felony, theft,		and assault, only a		
	or any assault, in a building or	may occur in the	CIMT if underlying		
	habitation; or	course of the offense,	assault is a CIMT.		
	5) Enters a building or	it does not require the			
	habitation and commits a	actual, attempted or			
	felony, theft or an assault	threatened use of			
		physical force as a			
		necessary element,			
		U.S v. Rodriguez-			
		Rodriguez			
		323 F.3d 317			
		(5 <sup>th</sup> Cir 2003)			
		(5 CH 2005)			
		Burglery is a crime of			
li l		Burglary is a crime of			

violence under the definition stated in 18 U.S.C. § 16 if a one year prison sentence (even if it is suspended) is imposed, U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Garcia Mendez, 420 F3 d 102 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\times C1 1994) U.S.V. Charles 30 F3 d 309 (\$\frac{16}{3}\tim		By Joan Goodw	rin and Thomas Esparza, J	rr. 1mmigration Specialisis	
Burglary of consent of owner; 2) Breaks imposed, U.S.C. § 16 if a one year prison sentence (even if it is suspended) is imposed, U.S.V. Guardade di P.3d 102 (5° Cir 1994) U.S.V. Guardade volvelice) and part of vehicle or any part of vehicle 3) With intent to commit any felony or theft commit any felony or the commit any felony or theft commit any felony or the					
Surglary of even if it is suspended) is imposed. U.S.V. Guardado 40 F.3d 102 (5° Cir 1994) U.S.V. Guardado 40 F.3d 102 (5° Cir 1994) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2005) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2005) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2005) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2005) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2005) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2005) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2005) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2005) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2000) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2000) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2000) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2000) U.S.V. Gravel Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5° Cir 2000) U.S.V. Charles 301 F.3d 309 (5° Cir 2002) U.S.V. Charles					
Surglary of Class A Misdemea nor  Burglary of Whisdenea nor  I) A person without effective consent of owner, 2) Breaks into or enters a vehicle or any part of vehicle 3) With intent to commit any felony or theth  Burglary of ovehicle 3) With intent to commit any felony or theth  Class A Class					
Burglary of which commit any felony or theft conviction for burglary of vehicle was an "aggravated felony" within meaning of Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. v. Ranos Garcia 95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1996)  A vehicle theft conviction is not a crime of violence be if does not puse a risk of injury to people as defined by the US Sentencing guidelines § 481.2(a))  U.S. v. Charles 300.9  Conviction for burglary of vehicle was an "aggravated felony" within meaning of Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. v. Ranos Garcia 95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1996)  A vehicle theft conviction is not a crime of violence be if does not puse a risk of injury to people as defined by the US Sentencing guidelines § 481.2(a))  U.S. v. Charles 300 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2002)  Conviction did not require a finding that the had actually committed theft, but rather mere mient to commit was sufficient; therefore this does not saisly the theft definition as per					
Burglary of Vehicles, Sanous vehicle of series of Sanous vehicle o					
Burglary of which consent of owner; 2) Breaks into or enters a vehicle or any part of vehicle 3) With intent to commit any felony or theft					
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IIRIRA; Lopez was			IIRIRA; Lopez was		
convicted of burglary					
of a vehicle not of a					
building, therefore he					

	Prepared for the City of Austin	did not commit 'burglary' for purposes of IIRIRA; therefore the INS' charge of burglary is invalid; burglary of a vehicle IS a 'crime of violence', Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, (5th Cir 2000)			
OFFENSE Criminal Trespass, § 30.05	1) enters or remains on or in property, including an aircraft or other vehicle, of another 2) without effective consent or 3) enters or remains in a building of another without effective consent and 4) had notice that the entry was forbidden; or 5) received notice to depart but failed to do so.	AGG FEL  Not an aggfel.	Probably not a CIMT as does not require evil intent.	COV, OTHER	ALT. PLEA
Theft, § 31.03	1) unlawfully appropriates property     2) with intent to deprive the owner of property.	Is aggfel under 101(a)(43)(G) if sentenced to at least one year. Deferred is not a sentence.	Theft is a CIMT if statute has as an element the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property.		
Unauthori zed Use of a Vehicle, § 31.07 State Jail Felony	1) Intentionally or knowingly 2) Operates another's boat, airplane or motor-propelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner	Not a COV as per 18 USC § 16(a), possibly a COV as per 18 USC 16(b)  Unauthorized use of a motor vehicle is not a crime of violence for sentence enhancement purposes; Although violent confrontations may occur in the course of the offense, it does not require the actual, attempted or threatened use of physical force as a necessary element U.S v. Rodriguez- Rodriguez 323 F.3d 317 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir 2003)  The risks of physical force being exerted during the commission of the burglary of a vehicle are	Not a CIMT because no permanent taking is required.		Try to negotiate a sentence of less than one year

### IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF SELECTED TEXAS OFFENSES: A QUICK REFERENCE CHART By Jodi Goodwin and Thomas Esparza, Jr. Immigration Specialists

		substantially similar to the risks of such force occurring while operating a vehicle without the owner's consent, court hold that the offense of unauthorized use of motor vehicle is a crime of violence within 18 U.S.C. § 16.  U.S v. Galvan- Rodriguez 169 F.3d 217 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir 2000)  But see, analysis pursuant to Vargas-Duran, Calderon-Pena, and Salazar-Ramirez, M-03-290, Slip Op. (S.D. Tex. September 20, 2004); Texas conviction under 31.07(a) is a crime of violence. Matter of Brieva, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (BIA 2005).			
OFFENSE	ELEMENTS	AGG FEL	CIMT	COV, OTHER	ALT. PLEA
Tampering with Identificati on Numbers, § 31.11	Detailed elements.	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(R) if sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year.  Deferred is not a term of imprisonment.	May not constitute CIMT as no evil intent is required. However, statute does require knowingly and intentionally altering identification markings, and acting knowingly and intentionally has been held to be sufficient for a CIMT determination.	33., 3111BK	
Forgery, § 32.21	1)forges a writing 2)with intent to defraud or harm another	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(R) if sentenced to a term of imprisonment for at least one year.  Deferred is not a term of imprisonment.	CIMT because contains an intent to defraud or harm another as an element.		
Credit Card Abuse, § 32.31 Fraudulent Transfer of a Motor Vehicle, § 32.34	Detailed elements.  Detailed elements	May be an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(M) if the loss exceeds \$10,000.  May be an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(M) if the vehicle is worth more than \$10,000.	CIMT because contains the element of intent to obtain a benefit fraudulently.  Divisible statute: sections requiring the intent to defraud are CIMT's; other two sections are arguably		

	Trepared for the City of Frustin	g.,	not CIMT's because do not contain an intent to defraud.	
Issuance of Bad Check, § 32.41	1) issues or passes a check or similar sight order 2) for the payment of money 3) knowing that the issuer does not have sufficient funds in or on deposit with the bank or other drawee for the payment in full of the check or order as well as all other checks or orders outstanding at the time of issuance.	May be an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(M) if the loss to the victim is more than \$10,000.	Not a CIMT unless statute requires intent to defraud as an element, even if statute requires knowledge of insufficient funds.	
Commerci al Bribery, § 32.43	Detailed elements	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(R) if sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year.  Deferred is not a term of imprisonment.	Any bribery conviction involves moral turpitude.	
Fraudulent use or possession of identifying informatio n, § 32.51	1) obtains, possesses, transfers, or uses 2) identifying information of another person 3) without the other person's consent and 4) with intent to harm or defraud another.	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(M) if the loss to the victim exceeds \$10,000.	Likely CIMT as it includes the element of intent to defraud or harm another.	
Unauthori zed use of telecomm unications service, § 33A.02	Detailed elements.	Not an aggfel	Does not seem to require an evil intent, so arguably not a CIMT.	
Theft of communic ations service, § 33A.04	Detailed elements	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(G) if sentenced to at lest one year. Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(M) if loss to victim is more than \$10,000.	CIMT only if evidence shows that a permanent taking was required or involved fraud.	
Money Launderin g, § 34.02	1)knowingly 2) acquires or maintains an interest in, receives, conceals, possesses, transfers, or transports 3) the proceeds of criminal activity; or 4) conducts, supervises, or facilitates a transaction 5) involving the proceeds of criminal activity; or 6) invests, expends, or receives, or offers to invest, expend, or receive,	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(D) if the loss is more than \$10,000.	CIMT because it involves a knowing mens rea regarding the proceeds of criminal activity. Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2003) (analyzing federal statute)	

	7) the proceeds of criminal activity or funds that the person believes are the proceeds of criminal activity.		<u> </u>		
Insurance Fraud, § 35.02	Detailed elements	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(M) if the loss to the victim exceeds \$10,000.	CIMT because it includes the element of intent to defraud or deceive. Martinez v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 255 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2005).		
OFFENSE	ELEMENTS	AGG FEL	CIMT	COV, OTHER	ALT. PLEA
Bribery, § 36.02	Detailed elements	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(S) if the person bribed was a witness and the term of imprisonment is at least one year.  Deferred is not a term of imprisonment.  Also, The TX statute is divisible. See <u>U.S.</u> v. Taylor.	All bribery offenses are CIMT's.		
Retaliation , §36.06	Detailed elements	Retaliation is not an aggravated felony crime of violence. <u>U.S. v. Martinez Mata</u> , 343 F.3d 625 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004).			
Perjury, § 37.02	1)with intent to deceive 2)and with knowledge of the statement's meaning: 3)makes a false statement 4) under oath or 5)swears to the truth of a false statement previously made and 6)the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath; or 7)makes a false unsworn declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code.	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)943)(S) if the term of imprisonment is at least one year.  Deffered is not a term of imprisonment.	Perjury has been held to be CIMT only if contains materiality as an element. Texas perjury statute does not contain materiality element. However, does contain intent to deceive, so may nonetheless be a CIMT. Note: Texas aggravated perjury statute does contain materiality element.		
Resisting Arrest, § 38.03	1)intentionally prevents or 2) obstructs 3)person he knows is a peace officer or 4)a person acting in a peace officer's presence and 5)at his direction 6)from effecting an arrest, search, or transportation of the actor or another 7)by using force against the	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(F) if sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year. Deferred is not imprionment.	No evil intent required, and so not likely to be CIMT.		

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	peace officer or another.				
Evading Arrest or Detention, § 38.04	1)intentionally flees 2)from a person he knows is a peace officer 3)attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him	Not an aggfel.	Does not require the use of force or fraud and so not likely a CIMT.		
Escape, § 38.06	Detailed elements	Not an aggfel.	Not likely CIMT since statute does not involve force or fraud.		
Bail jumping and failure to appear, § 38.10	1)intentionally or knowingly 2)fails to appear in accordance with the terms of his release	May be an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(T) if the underlying charge is a felony for which a sentence of 2 years MAY be imposed.	No evil intent required, but does require intentional and knowingly failing to appear, so may be considered turpitudinous.		
Failure to stop or report aggravated sexual assault of a child, § 38.17	Detailed elements.	Not an aggfel.	Would likely be considered CIMT because against societal morals.		
Harassme nt, § 42.07	Detailed elements	Not an aggfel.	Divisible statute: section (2) most likely to be CIMT, while other sections are arguably not CIMT's		
Stalking, § 42.072	Detailed elements	Not an aggfel.	Most likely a CIMT		
Cruelty to Animals, § 42.09	Detailed elements	Not an aggfel	Divisible statute: most sections not likely to constitute CIMT's		
Dog Fighting, § 42.10	Detailed elements	Not an aggfel.	Divisible statute: most sections not likely to constitute CIMT's		
Prostitutio n, § 43.02	1)knowingly 2)offers to engage, agrees to engage, or engages in sexual conduct 3)for a fee; or 4) solicits another 5)in a public place 6)to engage with him in sexual conduct 7)for hire.	Not an aggfel.	CIMT		
Promotion of Prostitutio n, § 43.03	1)acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for personally rendered prostitution services 2)knowingly: 3) receives money or other property 4)pursuant to an	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(K).	CIMT		

	agreement to participate in the proceeds of prostitution; or 5) solicits another to engage in sexual conduct with another person 6) for compensation.				
Possession or promotion of child pornograp hy, § 43.26	1)knowingly or intentionally 2)possesses 3)visual material 4)that visually depicts a child 5)younger than 18 years of age 6)at the time the image of the child was made 7)who is engaging in sexual conduct; and 8)the person knows 9)that the material depicts the child as described by Subdivision (1).	Is an aggfel as per 101(a)(43)(I).	Most likely CIMT because of child engaging in sexual conduct		
Unlawful Carrying of Weapons, § 46.02 Third Degree Felony	1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 2) Carries on or about his person a handgun, illegal knife or a club	Not an aggfel b/c no substantial risk that physical force against person or property of another may be used  46.02(c) is <b>not</b> crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) <u>U.S.v.</u> Hernandez-Neave 291 F.3d 296 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir 2001)	Not likely to be a CIMT because no intent to use against the person of another. District Court held NOT a CIMT for purposes of mandatory detention. Ramos Serrano v. Estrada, 201 F. Supp. 2d 714 (n.D. Texas May 13, 2002).		
OFFENSE Prohibited Weapons, § 46.05  Third Degree Felony or Class A Misdemea nor	ELEMENTS  1) Intentionally or knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, repairs or sells 2) A list of prohibited weapons (see statute)	AGG FEL Conflicting case law, not sure how this would be interpreted The unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm should be considered a crime of violence under §16(b)-U.S v. Rivas-Palacios 244 F.3d 396 (5th Cir 2001)  Possession of a short barrel firearm is not a crime of violence-U.S v. Diaz-Diaz 327 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2003)	CIMT  Not likely to be a CIMT because no intent to use against the person of another; more of a regulatory offense	COV, OTHER	ALT. PLEA  If charged under \$46.05(a)(5) or (a)(6), try to negotiate a sentence of less than a year
Public Intoxicatio	1)appears in a public place 2)while intoxicated	Not an aggfel.	Not a CIMT		

n, § 49.02	3)to the degree that the person may endanger the person or another	Commission on minigra			
Driving While Intoxicate d, § 49.04 Class B Misdemea	Intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place	Not an aggfel	Not a CIMT		
Driving While Intoxicate d, § 49.09(b)(2 ): Third Degree Felony	Intoxication while operating a motor vehicle in a public place     If two Misdemeanor violations, the offense is a Third degree felony	Not an aggfel. Not a crime of violence as per <u>Chapa-Garza</u> Court held that the felony offense of driving while intoxicated does not constitute a crime of violence under 18  U.S.C. § 16(b), <u>U.S v. Chapa-Garza</u> 243 F.3d 921 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir 2001)	Not a CIMT based on Torres-Varela  Under AZ law, aggravated DUI is not a CIMT, unless aggravating factor, such as driving with suspended license, exists. Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2001)		
Intoxication Assault, § 49.07  Third Degree Felony	1) Person by accident or mistake 2) While operating an aircraft, watercraft, or amusement ride while intoxicated, by reason of that intoxicating 3) Causes serious bodily injury to another OR 4) As a result of assembling a mobile amusement ride while intoxicated a) Causes serious bodily injury to another	5 <sup>th</sup> Cir held in Vargas-Duran that intoxication assault is a not crime of violence. See also US v. Villegas Hernandez, 468 F.3d 874 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006).  Because the Texas offense of intoxication assault requires proof that an intoxicated offender "cause[] serious bodily injury to another," we conclude that it has as an element the <i>use</i> of force against the person of another, U.S v. Vargas-Duran 319 F.3d 194 (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir 2003) rehearing en banc (5 <sup>th</sup> Cir January 28, 2004) (court held no INTENTIONAL use of force is required to commit intoxication assault, therefore, not a COV)	Likely not a CIMT because can be committed by accident or mistake, and so no evil intent required.	No COV. See Vargas-Duran.	
OFFENSE	ELEMENTS	AGG FEL	CIMT	COV, OTHER	ALT. PLEA
Possession of		No. At least for single offense. <u>Lopez v.</u>	PCS offenses are generally held not be		

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Controlled	Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct.	CIMT's because	
Substance	625 (2006).	statutes don't usually	
s, §		contain an intent	
481.115,		element. However, the	
481.116,		Texas statute does	
481.117,		require knowing or	
481.119(b		intentional possession	
), 481.121		so ICE may attempt to	
		argue possession is a	
		CIMT.	
Manufactu	Yes, meets the	Likely CIMT because	
re or	common ordinary	of knowing and intent	
Delivery	meaning of drug	elements.	
of a	trafficking.		
Controlled			
Substance,			
§ 481.112,			
481.1121,			
481.113,			
481.114,			
481.120			

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I was born in South Texas to immigrant parents, the late Dr. Thomas Esparza, Sr. and Esther LaMadrid Esparza, my teachers and mentors. A graduate of Texas A&M and the University of Texas Law School; I joined the American Immigration Lawyer's Association (AILA) in 1980. A member of the National Lawyer's Guild National Immigration Project, I am past Chair of the Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico Chapter of AILA and the Vice-Chairman of the Austin Commission on Immigrant Affairs. I also serve on the steering committee of the Immigrant Services Network of Austin (ISNA). I lecture for the University of Texas, the State Bar of Texas, the Travis County Bar, and AILA. I contribute immigration law articles to both English and Spanish language media. I answer email at tom@tomesparza.com. I honor my mentors Attorneys Laurier McDonald of Edinburg, Texas, Bob Shivers of San Antonio, Harry Gee and Charles Foster of Houston and Harry Joe of Dallas, pioneers in immigration law. I am married to the former Minerva Gonzalez of Bryan and the father of a son, Alex, who just got his driver's license, and growing up to way to twins Carina and Helena. My faith, my family, my clients have given me all I have. I am so blessed.